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Abstract 
The premise of much intercultural communication pedagogy and research is to educate 
people from different cultures towards open and transformative positions of mutual 
understanding and respect. This discourse in the instance of its articulation realises and 
sustains Intercultural Communication epistemologically – as an academic field of social 
enquiry, and judgementally – as one which locates itself on a moral terrain. By adopting an 
ethical stance towards difference, the discourse of intercultural communication finds itself 
caught in a series of aporias, or performative contradictions, where interculturalists are 
projected simultaneously into positions of cultural relativism on the one hand and ideological 
totalism on the other. Such aporias arise because the theoretical premises upon which the 
discourse relies are problematic. This paper traces these thematics to a ‘politics of presence’ 
operating within the discourse of intercultural communication, and links this to questions of 
judgement and truth in the intercultural public sphere.  The paper proposes that the politics of 
presence be set aside in favour of an intercultural praxis which is oriented to responsibility 
rather than to truth. 
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Introduction: the discourse of intercultural communication 
For seven years now the International Association for Languages and Intercultural 
Communication (IALIC) has sought to bring together multidisciplinary perspectives and 
understandings in intercultural communication studies. This endeavour has largely proceeded 
on the premise that the people who are engaged in it have an interest in culture in one form or 
another, and in the differences (and commonalities) which exist within and between diverse 
communities at local and global levels. It is difficult, given the diversity of the material that 
exists, to try sum up in a few sentences the nature of the shared sentiment we as members of 
IALIC have, which supplies us with the motivation to renew our subscriptions, attend IALIC 
conferences, and submit papers to proceedings and to issues of the association journal; but in 
its most general aspect we might say that we are concerned to promote intercultural 
understanding and awareness across cultural divides, and to transform individual human 
consciousnesses in some way that is productive and positive for the communities to which we 
belong, as well as those to which we do not.  We are also, inevitably, concerned with the 
academy, and the dissemination amongst our peers of scholarly research as an enjoining, we 
hope, to a greater intensity of intercultural praxis and debate.   
 
The discourse of intercultural communication, for that is what we shall call it, seeks to be 
interventionist, and prefers to think of itself as such (see Tomic & Kelly, 2001, 2002; Tomic 
& Thurlow, 2002, 2004; Phipps & Guilherme, 2003; Giroux, 2003, 2006; Jack, 2004). It 
intervenes in the transnational public arena of intercultural debate in the belief that such 
interventions may help to reduce conflict, promote cooperation and increase intercultural 
understanding. It seeks to publicise and raise awareness of the ‘languaging’ of intercultures, 
that is, of the ‘linguicism’ of national and supranational cultures and identities, and of how 
language permeates, mediates and constructs them.  This includes conceptions of the 
possibility of a ‘transcultured self’ – the multicultured self/other who traverses the intercultural 
terrain in openness, understanding, and tolerance of the Other (Jordan, 2001; Crawshaw et al, 
2001; Holland, 2002; Liu, 2002; Parry, 2003; Monceri, 2003, 2005; Strümper-Krobb, 2003; 
Turner, 2003; Pan, 2004; Glaser, 2005). Above all, the discourse of intercultural 
communication draws critically from the well of global injustice and human disenchantment 
a desire ‘to confront and resist […] the inequalities of cultural and economic capital’ (Tomic 
& Thurlow, 2002: 82; see also Tomic and Lengel, 1999).   Jack (2004: 122), invoking Marx,  
states, ‘[o]ur aim is not just to understand this inequitable world, the point is to change it’ 
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(see Marx, 1845/2000: 173). The transculturalism and criticality of the association has been 
augmented by an impressive interdisciplinary range of conference papers, editorial pages, and 
journal articles (e.g. Shi-xu & Wilson, 2001; Roy and Starosta, 2001; Walravens, 2002; 
Tietze, 2004; Stibbe, 2004; Wilkinson, 2005, Bielsa, 2005; Menezes de Souza, 2006; Cheng 
& Warren, 2006; Cools, 2006) and by a strong concern for pedagogy (e.g. Sharifian, 2001; 
Diaz-Greenburg & Nevin, 2003; Ros i Solé, 2004; Belz, 2005; Gonçalves Matos, 2005; Atay, 
2005; Shi, 2006; Crosbie, 2006; MacDonald et al, 2006). Taken as a whole these elements of 
the association’s activities constitute a formidable helix of interdisciplinary interests and 
concerns.  At the risk of ruining a promising metaphor, the discourse of intercultural 
communication is the thread which holds the helix together – it is no less than its intercultural 
genome. 
Transformation, transcendentalism and truth 
The problem with threads is that, if pulled, they have a tendency to unravel the thing that they 
are attached to. This is a serious problem, because what we are dealing with is something 
extremely important, so important in fact that doing any kind of intercultural work is 
impossible without it. This is, the rationale for doing intercultural work at all. For IALIC it is 
unnervingly easy to formulate an answer to the question which this implies; one that makes 
us feel good about ourselves, and which readily legitimates the critical stand that we want to 
take. The easy answer is that we do intercultural work because we want to empower people, 
to raise their awareness about exploitation, manipulation, prejudice and abuse, and to move 
them to act upon this awareness – we want to provoke a transformational response.  One of 
the more substantial voices arguing for such an agenda is Giroux (2003, 2006), who in a 
recent edition of the journal declares that: 
 
Intellectuals have a responsibility not only to make truth prevail in the world and 
fight injustice wherever it appears, but also to organise their collective passions to 
prevent human suffering, genocide and diverse forms of unfreedom linked to 
domination and exploitation […] Such a stance not only connects intellectual work 
to making dominant power accountable, it also makes concrete the possibility for 
transforming hope and politics into an ethical space and public act that confronts the 
flow of everyday experience and the weight of social suffering with the force of 
individual and collective resistance and the unending project of democratic social 
transformation. (Giroux, 2006: 170-71) 
 
Thurlow, from a pedagogic perspective, invokes hooks, in referring to this attitude as one of 
‘teaching to transgress’ (Tomic & Thurlow, 2002: 83; hooks, 1994; Thurlow, 2004). But not 
all of us are entirely comfortable with the idea of doing this. Many teachers, for example, do 
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not see it as their role either to radicalise their students or to disturb their carefully 
sedimented subjectivities. Others, like ourselves, do ascribe to this view, but not 
unproblematically, and not unquestioningly either.  Still, within IALIC we sense that there 
would be general agreement that the association does have a transformational purpose which 
sees the desedimentation of subjectivities as a positive and productive intervention because it 
gives strength to the hope that ‘things might be different some day’ (Adorno, 1973: 323).  
Disagreement with the propositions which Giroux, Thurlow, and others in IALIC have put 
forward for a transformational approach is therefore not our precise purpose in this paper.  
The propositions are indeed all too easy to agree with, and it is this which is part of the 
problem.  For in agreeing to them we also seem to be signing up for a politics of presence (cf. 
Derrida, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1988; see also Thurlow, 2004). Of this, and what it means, we 
will have more to say in a moment.  
 
In this paper we wish to enquire into the grounds on which, in the discourse of intercultural 
communication, these types of propositions are made, about justice, equality, prejudice, and 
so on.  To put this another way, if the answer as to why we engage in intercultural 
communication pedagogy and research is easy, much more difficult is how we are supposed 
to know that the truth that we wish to prevail, and to instil in our students, is the correct one. 
More pointedly, on the basis of what privileged insight are we able to make that claim?  For 
we are claiming privilege here, the privilege that we are able to determine for others what the 
truth is, about power, about suffering, about difference, about the ‘emerging global 
barbarism’ around us (Giroux, 2006: 171).  It will be averred that this truth is always open to 
debate and critical analysis in the intercultural public sphere, and is therefore open to 
modification and even refutation.  Yes, but what makes it superior and different to the other 
‘truths’ that are out there, to which we are opposed, for example about globalisation, so-
called good-governance, sovereignty, self-determination, God, and war, which are also 
equally open to debate in the same public sphere?  How, in other words, is the discourse of 
intercultural communication not just another metanarrative (Lyotard, 1984) – a master-
template for ‘explaining’ the totality, and for restructuring it in another ‘truer’ way?  
Problems arise when the master-narrative does indeed lead to a process of transformation 
only to come into conflict, as it must do, with those who are not persuaded by it, let’s say in 
our case neo-conservatives, traditionalist religious groups, female circumcisionists, and anti-
abortionists, all of whom in our wide fraternity are not necessarily the Other, and who may 
also reasonably object to being lumped together in this manner. Nevertheless, it seems that in 
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order for our truth to prevail, the interests of at least some (all?) of these groups must be 
subordinated to our own, and if needs be, silenced by force.  On what grounds would our use 
of force against these groups be legitimated?  Can it be legitimated?  Do we sign up for this 
force?  These are difficult questions to which the discourse of intercultural communication 
has no ready answers beyond the insistence that our truth is the correct truth, and that to 
question this is a form of intellectual cowardice (Giroux, 2003: 184). 
 
It seems to us that the only way the discourse of intercultural communication is presently able 
to ground itself is by appealing to a transcendental moral signified.  That is, a Kantian 
noumenon, or moral theism, existing outside human experience against which truth claims 
can be measured and truth judgements made.  Kant saw the operation of the noumenon as 
apriori to the world and distilled it in his work in terms of a faith that it was there.  That is, he 
believed that it existed, but also that it was impossible to step outside our world to see it, 
know it, or experience it. The discourse of intercultural communication is a Kantian discourse 
in this respect.  It relies on having faith that its truths are the correct truths, but is unable to 
explain why this is so.  This is the problem faced by all discourses which claim truth to 
themselves, and brings to mind one of Nietzsche’s observations.  He said, ‘There are no facts, 
everything is in flux, incomprehensible, elusive; what is relatively most enduring is – our 
opinions’ (Nietzsche, 1968: 327).  If the discourse of intercultural communication is unable 
to ground itself other than by appealing to a-historical and a-discursive transcendentals, how 
does its truth rise above that of an opinion?  How also are we to be able to adjudicate between 
different truth claims and to decide which ones to support, respect, or condemn?  For 
example, female circumcision, arranged marriages the wearing of the veil abortion?  If we are 
unable to respond to these questions effectively, we leave ourselves open either to cultural 
relativism, in which all social practices are equally good, or to political inertia, in which the 
only question is ‘Why bother?’  Why bother with consciousness raising and why bother with 
intellectual work if we are unable to make judgemental claims about truth?   
Intercultural consciousness and the politics of presence 
Let us return to this question in a moment.  First, we will put some additional flesh on the 
problem. We have referred to a politics of presence inhabiting the corridors of intercultural 
communication debate. By a politics of presence we are speaking of an Enlightenment desire 
for plenitude, for a satisfactory repletion of ideas and outcomes, a fulfilling resolution of 
difference.  In other words, it is the desire we have for fulfilment and purity in the concepts 
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that we employ in our work and the consequences which they portend.  So we wish for 
justice, equality, understanding, openness, truth, etc – an organic ordering of the intercultural 
whole, in which all these elements are all neatly arranged. In the discourse of intercultural 
communication this translates as a desire for the transformation of intercultural 
consciousness, that is, for a transformational change in the consciousness of the intercultural 
speaker. In our work this has most frequently been expressed as a pedagogic aim in learning 
of foreign languages: 
 
Intercultural competence, as part of a broader foreign speaker competence, 
identifies the ability of a person to behave adequately and in a flexible manner when 
confronted with actions, attitudes and expectations of representatives of foreign 
cultures. (Meyer, 1991: 137) 
 
The intercultural speaker is someone who crosses frontiers, and who is to some 
extent a specialist in the transit of cultural property and symbolic values. (Byram & 
Zarate, 1997: 11)  
 
We may therefore claim to have an epistemologically reasoned basis on which to 
assert that cross-cultural competence implies a certain kind of linguistic 
competence…and that such linguistic competence implies having acquired, not 
simply a new way to represent ideas or to get things done, but – above all – a new 
way of being (Boylan, 2000). 
 
These pedagogic aims appear to entail a weak claim and a strong claim in the development of 
an intercultural consciousness. The weak claim is that the intercultural speaker is enabled to 
recognise difference in the beliefs, attitudes and values of the Other, and to tolerate this 
difference. This already entails a certain shift in the consciousness and the identity of the 
Self. The strong claim is the one which was noted earlier, that the intercultural speaker 
recognises difference in the beliefs, attitudes and values of the Other, and actually embraces 
them in order to become transcultured. This then marks a move towards a hybridization of 
consciousness and identity, towards transculturation. The logical endpoint of the strong claim 
would be the development of an integrated universal consciousness, and it is this which 
provides the strong claim’s politics of presence.  In this respect IALIC seems to be retreading 
the philosophical journey of the nineteenth century. The need for fulfilled transformational 
meaning, or presence, is an idea which has a long intellectual history in both western and 
eastern thought.  In the west, it is Hegel who first sets this idea in motion. In the Philosophy 
of History (1822) he presents the view that the history of humankind involves the 
transformational development of Mind, or Spirit, towards full consciousness. 
 
World history merely shows how the spirit gradually attains consciousness and the 
will to truth; it progresses from its early glimmerings to major discoveries and 
finally to a state of complete consciousness … The principles of the national spirits 
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in their necessary progression are themselves only moments of the one universal 
spirit, which ascends through them in the course of history to its consummation in 
an all embracing totality. (Hegel, 1822/1999: 404). 
 
Mind/Spirit is a collective consciousness, and may be equated with the cogito, Reason.  It is 
through the exercise of reason that the full consciousness of humanity is attained. Until this 
time each individual subsists as an ‘unhappy consciousness’ – unfulfilled, confused, and 
alienated. This alienation is experienced as an incomprehension of the world the unhappy 
consciousness inhabits and as a sensation of separation from the Other.  In the 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) Hegel writes: 
 
The Unhappy Consciousness itself is the gazing of one self-consciousness into 
another, and itself is both, and the unity of both is also its essential nature.  But it is 
not yet explicitly aware that it is its essential nature, or that it is the unity of both.  
(Hegel, 1807/1999: 104; original emphasis) 
 
In other words, the unhappy consciousness is not aware that its identity, its understanding of 
its Self, is dependent upon and only established through the existence of the Other.  That its 
identity is in truth that of a 
self
/other.  The alienation of the unhappy consciousness is resolved 
by humankind’s eventual realisation that the Self and the Other are one and the same, that 
there is no difference between them – Mind is everything.  This occurs as a staged awakening 
of Mind through history, that is, as an exponential transformation of consciousness and 
awareness through time towards absolute knowledge and understanding. This full 
rationalisation of the world brings history to an end. There is in this teleology some 
remarkable similarities with the teachings of Buddhism. Here we find the journey of 
humankind towards full consciousness embodied in the quest of Sidarta for Enlightenment. 
Where Hegel sees the attainment of universal consciousness as a dialectical progression of 
Mind through historical epochs, one more enlightened than the other, Buddhism sees the 
attainment of a transcendental consciousness, or Nirvana, as the endpoint of a process of 
personal ‘cultivation’ of being: ‘Nirvana…is the primal bright essence of consciousness that 
can bring forth all conditions’. (Hsuan, ___, p. 239) 
 
Marx responds to this universalised narrative by inverting Hegel’s dialectic of consciousness 
and placing it on a materialist base.   
Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc – real, active men, as they are 
conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the 
intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms.  Consciousness can 
never be anything else other than conscious existence, and the existence of men is 
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their actual life process […] In direct contrast to German philosophy which 
descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven (Marx, 
1846/2000: 180).   
 
In Marx’s hands the historical progress of the Hegelian dialectic by means of reason is thus 
replaced with historical progress by means of advances in the material forces of production.  
Moreover, it is the material circumstances of existence which are ultimately determinate of 
human consciousness, and not the other way around: ‘It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their 
consciousness’ (Marx, 1859/2000: 425).  What is unchanged in this reformulation is that the 
project it announces still articulates a politics of presence. Where presence for Hegel is 
absolute knowledge and the fully rational society, where ‘the whole is the true’ (Hegel, 
1807/1999: 53), presence for Marx requires individuals ‘to abolish the very condition of their 
existence hitherto’ (Marx, 1846/2000: 198), that is, the exploitation of one class by another 
under Capitalism. Presence for Marx is thus embodied in the classless organics of the post-
capitalist society.  
Totality and terror in intercultural communication 
The politics of presence comes in for sustained critique by Nietzsche (1968), and later by 
Adorno (1973, 1977) and Foucault (1980, 1981, 1984), who all see ‘presence’ as totalising, 
although they do not use the term.  For Nietzsche, presence is articulated as a will to power – 
‘A kind of lust to rule [which] would like to compel all other drives to accept it as a norm’ 
(Nietzsche, 1968: 267).  For Adorno, the desire for presence is termed ‘identity thinking’, that 
is, a type of thinking which posits reconciliation of the whole.  To Hegel he says, ‘A mind 
that is to be a totality is a nonsense. It resembles the political parties in the singular which 
made their appearance in the twentieth century, tolerating no other parties beside them […] 
The whole is the false’ (Adorno, 1973: 199; 1978: 50).  To Marx he says history guarantees 
us nothing – ‘No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one 
which leads from the slingshot to the megaton bomb’ (Adorno, 1973: 430).  Foucault, adopts 
a Nietzschean view of the desire for presence, as a will to truth, and asks, ‘What types of 
knowledge do you want to disqualify, in the very instance of your demand?’  (Foucault, 
1980: 85). For all three, the desire for presence masks a potential violence, a terror, because it 
must involve the suppression of other kinds of thinking if its truth is to prevail.   
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The violence of presence is nowhere better elaborated than in the work of Derrida (1976, 
1978, 1981, 1988).  Indeed, presence is his term. Derrida first draws our attention to presence 
in the logocentric workings of the Saussurean sign.  Here the union of the signifier and the 
signified seems to satisfy, in the first instance, a desire for a certain type of fulfilment, that of 
having a sound or mark which can be used to refer to a concept. But having seemingly named 
the concept, we find that the concept has no meaning except in its difference from other 
signs, as there are no self-identical words or signs.  He gives this the name différance, a 
neologism for how the sign is never truly fulfilled. Différance entails that there are no pure 
signs – ‘there is no experience consisting of pure presence’ (Derrida, 1988: 10).  For 
example, the ‘inside’ can never be a pure inside, because it is dependent on there being an 
‘outside’.  For this reason Derrida demonstrates how the essence of the signified must be 
formally prior to the sign, and that fulfilment, or full presence, cannot be claimed except by 
making recourse ‘in favour of a meaning supposedly antecedent to différance, more original 
than it, exceeding and governing it in the last analysis.  This is […] the presence of […] the 
‘transcendental signified’’ (Derrida, 1981: 29) – the signified to which all signifiers 
ultimately refer, where meaning can come to rest in itself.  If the transcendental signified is 
prior to the sign, it is, like Kant’s noumenon, a-discursive and a-historical, outside our 
experience, unknowable. The transcendental signified is the object of the human longing for 
fulfilment and plenitude – a craving for the unfulfilled unity of the sign itself. 
 
The longing for presence does violence to the sign by seeking to ‘fix’ its concepts against the 
transcendental signified. For Derrida, this is an impossibility. The transcendental signified is 
not present to us, it is outside the text, of which there is ‘no outside’ (Derrida, 1976: 156).  
Meaning, therefore, cannot be ‘fixed’.  In place of the absent signified Derrida posits an 
endless chain of signifiers, one referring to the other ad infinitum. In his words, ‘The meaning 
of meaning … is infinite implication, the indefinite referral of signifier to signifier … its 
force is a certain pure and infinite equivocality which gives signified meaning no respite, no 
rest, but engages in its own economy so that it always signifies again and differs’ (Derrida, 
1978: 29; original emphasis).  This entails that no meaning can ever be fully grasped in its 
entirety, complete and whole, in its full presence, because signifiers only refer, and time does 
stop for them.  To claim that we know what justice, or truth, or understanding is, is therefore a 
deceit, and a violence to these concepts, for by attempting to fix them we close them down. 
We also run into the danger of arrogating to ourselves the belief that we have privileged 
access to the noumenal signified, the signified outside, and this is dangerous, for in claiming 
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such entitlements, truth becomes an organising principle against which ‘lesser’ truths might 
then be measured. When truth becomes an organising principle, it finds itself in conflict with 
these lesser truths, and reacts with violence towards them.  The western alliance’s ‘War on 
Terror’ and the naked Jihadism of Al-Qaeda are both examples of truths which are being used 
in this way.  The will to truth is a colonising discourse, it colonises the discursive terrain 
according to its own perceptions based as it is on the apparent obviousness of its own moral 
correctness (O’Regan, 2006). 
Conclusion: Reconstructing intercultural praxis 
We wonder then where this leaves the discourse of intercultural communication. If we cannot 
ground it upon truth, and we cannot distinguish between which cultural practices we should 
support and which we should not, what should we ground it upon?  How do we avoid cultural 
relativism and inertia?  Is there any way of reconstructing an intercultural praxis so that it was 
no longer dependent upon claims to truth?  These are some of the questions that concern us, 
and to which we seek an answer.  Is there a way out of these aporias? 
 
Perhaps there is, if we can be responsible about it. For if judgemental truths are caught up in 
the metaphysical complicity of a signed universe which cannot be critiqued without recourse 
to the sign itself (Derrida, 1978), the motivation and rationale for critique has to be derived 
from within a system of signs in which ethical concepts are not dependent upon 
transcendentals – a transcendental signified. For this reason, the discourse ethics of Derrida 
posits that we have an infinite responsibility to the Other, for without this responsibility, ‘you 
would not have moral and political problems, and everything that follows from this’ (Derrida 
cited in Critchley, 1999: 108; see also Derrida, 2003). In other words, it is through 
responsibility, rather than through the foundationalist presuppositions of presence, that the 
discursive terrain remains open, and that questions of ‘non-normative’ ethical judgement 
become possible, and indeed necessary. Without responsibility, the hope which is carried in 
the possibility of the Other that, for example, things might be different one day, as well as the 
praxis which such hope implies, would be denied. By focusing on our responsibility to the 
Other, and therefore on our responsibility to openness in opposition to closure, the point is to 
determine not whether different truths are good or bad, but whether putting a particular 
discourse or set of discourses into practice might lead to a silencing of open alternatives, and 
therefore also a turning away from the Other. That these alternatives should be open makes it 
possible for IALIC theoretically to locate itself in opposition to perspectives and practices 
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which we, as interculturalists, would associate with closure while simultaneously seeking to 
exercise reflexive support for more open alternatives, not because we know it is right to do so 
but because we know that not to do so would be an act of irresponsibility. 
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